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Abstract 
In the presence of an endogenous treatment and a valid instrument, causal effects are 
(nonparametrically) point identified only for the subpopulation of compliers, given that the 
treatment is monotone in the instrument. Further populations of likely policy interest have 
been widely ignored in econometrics. Therefore, we use treatment monotonicity and/or 
stochastic dominance assumptions to derive sharp bounds on the average treatment effects 
of the treated population, the entire population, the compliers, the always takers, and the 
never takers. We also provide an application to labor market data and briefly discuss 
testable implications of the instrumental exclusion restriction and stochastic dominance. 
Keywords 
Instrument, noncompliance, principal stratification, nonparametric bounds. 
JEL Classification 
C14, C31, C36 1 Introduction
Endogeneity of the (binary) treatment variable and noncompliance to the treatment assignment
in randomized experiments are widespread phenomenons in the evaluation of treatment eects,
see for instance Bloom (1984). In the presence of an instrumental variable (IV) such as random
treatment assignment, Imbens and Angrist (1994) (see also Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996)
show that average treatment eects are point identied only for a subpopulation, given that the
treatment is monotone in the instrument. This local average treatment eect (LATE) refers to
the so called compliers, whose treatment status reacts on a change in the instrument. If both the
treatment and the instrument are binary and monotonicity is positive, the compliers are those
with the treatment value always being equal to the instrument value.
Whether the LATE is a relevant parameter heavily depends on the empirical context and has
been controversially discussed in the literature, see for instance Imbens (2009), Deaton (2010),
and Heckman and Urz ua (2010). In many applications, one prefers to make inference for further
or dierent populations. E.g., applications in the program evaluation literature typically want to
learn about the average treatment eects (ATE) on the treated or on the entire population. Note
that these parameters are themselves weighted averages of the ATEs on several subpopulations,
including the always takers (always treated irrespective of the instrument) and the never takers
(never treated irrespective of the instrument). So far, any of these groups has been widely ignored
in the econometric literature.
An exception is Fr olich and Lechner (2010) who also point identify the ATEs on the always
takers and never takers. Therefore, they invoke both IV and selection on observables (or condi-
tional independence, see for instance Imbens, 2004) assumptions. This identication strategy is,
however, in contrast to virtually all other IV applications, where an instrument is used exactly
for the reason that no other source of identication (such as selection on observables) is avail-
able. Then, point identication for the never takers, always takers, the treated, and the entire
population is not feasible in a nonparametric framework (unless the complier share is 100 %).
1The main contribution of this paper is to show that informative nonparametric bounds on the
ATEs for populations other than the compliers can be attained under relatively weak assumptions.
In many empirical applications the identication of a reasonable set of values for the ATE on, for
instance, the treated might be preferable to the point identication of the LATE, which may suer
from decreased external validity. The assumptions invoked in this paper are (i) monotonicity of
the treatment in the instrument and (ii) stochastic dominance of the potential outcomes of one
subpopulation over the others. The identifying power of these restrictions is investigated both
separably and jointly using the principal stratication framework suggested by Frangakis and
Rubin (2002). We derive sharp bounds for the always takers, never takers, the treated, and the
entire population. As a further contribution, we nd testable implications of the IV exclusion
restriction and stochastic dominance when monotonicity is invoked.
Partial identication of economic parameters in general goes back to Manski (1989, 1994) and
Robins (1989). Previous work on nonparametric bounds under treatment endogeneity, which is
the problem considered here, has exclusively focused on the ATE on the entire population,1 but
neglected further populations. Manski (1990) bounds the ATE by invoking only mean indepen-
dence between the potential outcomes and the instrument. Considering binary outcomes, Balke
and Pearl (1997) derive sharp bounds under the same statistical independence considered in Im-
bens and Angrist (1994) and under monotonicity (see also Dawid, 2003) of the treatment in the
instrument. Also Shaikh and Vytlacil (2010) bound the ATE on the entire population in the
binary outcome case under monotonicity, see Bhattacharya, Shaikh, and Vytlacil (2005) for an
application. In addition, Shaikh and Vytlacil (2010) also consider the so-called \monotone treat-
ment response" assumption of Manski (1997), which a priori restricts the direction of the treat-
ment eect. This appears unattractive given that the latter is unknown and has to be estimated
and will, therefore, not be considered here. Cheng and Small (2006) extend the results for binary
outcomes to three treatments (in contrast to the standard binary treatment framework consid-
ered here) under particular forms of (one-sided) noncompliance.
1For the derivation of semiparametric bounds on the ATE on the entire population, see Chiburis (2010) and the
references therein.
2In contrast to much of the epidemiologic literature, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and Kita-
gawa (2009) allow for both discrete and continuous outcomes. Kitagawa partially identies the
potential outcome distributions for the entire population under (various forms of) the exclusion
restriction and monotonicity and derives bounds on the ATE. Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) in-
voke a nonparametric threshold crossing model for the treatment instead of monotonicity for de-
riving the bounds. However, both approaches are equivalent by the results of Vytlacil (2002).
One interesting nding of Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and Kitagawa (2009) is that the width
of their bounds is the same as those of Manski (1990) (see also Balke and Pearl, 1997, for binary
outcomes), given that the monotonicity/threshold crossing model assumptions are satised.
The present work adds to the literature on nonparametric bounds under endogeneity by con-
sidering more populations and an extended set of identifying assumptions. The identifying power
of jointly imposing monotonicity and stochastic dominance is demonstrated in an empirical appli-
cation to the U.S. Job Training Partnership Act. Using experimental data previously analyzed by
Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002), we nd (in addition to the point identied complier eect) a
signicantly positive ATE on the earnings of the treated that lies within reasonably tight bounds.
Monotonicity and stochastic dominance have also been considered in a dierent context, namely
under non-random sample selection and attrition, see for instance Zhang and Rubin (2003), Lech-
ner and Melly (2007), Zhang, Rubin, and Mealli (2008), and Lee (2009), and Huber and Mellace
(2010).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the
endogeneity/noncompliance problem based on principal stratication. Section 3 discusses the
identifying assumptions and derives bounds on the ATEs for various populations. Section 4
very briey presents the estimators. In Section 5, we consider an empirical application to
experimental labor market data. Section 6 concludes.
32 Using principal stratication to characterize noncompliance
Suppose that we want to estimate the eect of a binary treatment T 2 f1;0g (e.g., a training
activity) on an outcome Y (e.g., labor market success such as employment or earnings) evaluated
at some point in time after the treatment. We will use the experimental framework to motivate
the problems of endogeneity and noncompliance. Assume that individuals are randomly assigned
into treatment or non-treatment according to the binary assignment variable Z 2 f1;0g, which
will serve as instrument. Denote by T(z) the potential treatment state for Z = z, and by Yi(1)
and Yi(0) the potential outcomes (see for instance Rubin, 1974) of individual i under treatment
and non-treatment.
Throughout the discussion we will rule out interference between individuals as well as
general equilibrium eects of the treatment, which is implied by the \Stable Unit Treatment
Value assumption" (SUTVA), see for instance Rubin (1990). Furthermore, we will assume that
mere assignment does not have any direct eect on the potential outcomes other than through
the treatment. Taking assignment to a training as an example, this rules out that individuals
change their labor market state as a reaction of being assigned to the training. What matters
is whether the training is actually received. This exclusion restriction and the SUTVA are
formalized in Assumption 1 (see also Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996):
Assumption 1:
Y (t;Z) = Y (t) 8 t 2 f0;1g (exclusion restriction);
and
Yi(ti)?tj and Ti(zi)?zj 8j 6= i (SUTVA):
Of course, the individual eect Yi(1)   Yi(0) can never be evaluated as individual i is
either treated or not treated, but cannot be observed in both states. However, under
particular assumptions aggregate parameters such as the average treatment eect (ATE)
 = E[Y (1)]   E[Y (0)] can be identied.
4Our second assumption restricts Z to be independent of the potential values of any post-
assignment variables, which holds by random assignment. Analogous to Imbens and Angrist
(1994), we make the following joint independence assumption:
Assumption 2:
Z?T(1);T(0);Y (1);Y (0) (joint independence);
where \?" denotes independence. Alternatively, one may assume that independence only holds
conditional on some observed pre-assignment variables X, such that Assumption 2 changes to
Z?T(1);T(0);Y (1);Y (0)jX = x; 8x 2 X, where X denotes the support of X. This is closely
related to the framework of Fr olich (2007) who shows point identication of the LATE given a
conditionally valid instrument (given X). In the further discussion, conditioning on X will be
kept implicit, such that all results either refer to the experimental framework or to an analysis
within cells of X. Assumption 2 is equivalent to the \random assignment restriction" in Kitagawa
(2009) who, as an alternative, also considers the following, weaker assumption: Z?Y (1);Y (0).
This case would allow for dependence between the instrument and the potential treatment states.
It is not considered in this paper, as it is not consistent with (successful) randomization, which
implies independence of Z and any potential post-treatment variables.
Note that experimental compliance is perfect if T(1) = 1 and T(0) = 0 for all individuals. In
this case and under Assumptions 1 and 2, E[Y jZ = 1]   E[Y jZ = 0] = E[Y jT = 1]   E[Y jT =
0] = E[Y (1)]   E[Y (0)] = , where the rst equality follows from perfect compliance and the
second from random assignment. As all individuals are compliers, the ATE is identied. However,
if post-assignment complications occur such that T(z) 6= z for some subpopulation, selection bias
may aw the validity of the evaluation in spite of the randomization of the assignment. This is
due to the potential threat that individuals systematically select themselves into the treatment
according to their potential outcomes.
Using the principal stratication framework advocated by Frangakis and Rubin (2002), the
population can be divided into four principal strata, denoted by G, according to the choice of T
5as a reaction of Z. As outlined in Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), the four groups are the
compliers, the always takers, who are always treated irrespective of the assignment, the never
takers, who are never treated irrespective of the assignment, and the deers, who are treated
when not assigned, but not treated when assigned:
Table 1: Principal strata
Principal strata (G) T(1) T(0) Notion
11 1 1 Always takers
10 1 0 Compliers
01 0 1 Deers
00 0 0 Never takers
It is obvious that we cannot directly observe the principal stratum an individual belongs to
as either T(1) or T(0) is known. Let Gi 2 f11;10;01;00g represent the principal stratum to
which subject i belongs. By Assumption 2, Gi is not aected by the instrument and can be
regarded as a covariate that is only partially observed in the data. Independence implies that
Y (0);Y (1)?zjT(0);T(1) (or Y (0);Y (1)?zjT(0);T(1);X under conditional independence). Thus,
potential outcomes are independent of the instrument given the principal stratum. Therefore,
any eect of Z on Y conditional on a principal stratum is well dened. It is yet not causal, as
the instrument has no direct eect on the outcome by Assumption 1. Any change in Y following
a change in Z must be triggered by a change in T. Hence, if the eect of Z on Y can be
scaled by the eect of Z on T within a stratum, the ATE of T on Y can be recovered for the
respective subpopulation. This is exactly how the LATE on the compliers is identied under the
monotonicity assumption discussed further below.
Table 2: Observed subgroups and principal strata
Observed subgroups o(Z;T) principal strata
o(1;1) = fi : Zi = 1;Ti = 1g subject i belongs either to 11 or to 10
o(1;0) = fi : Zi = 1;Ti = 0g subject i belongs either to 01 or to 00
o(0;1) = fi : Zi = 0;Ti = 1g subject i belongs either to 11 or to 01
o(0;0) = fi : Zi = 0;Ti = 0g subject i belongs either to 10 or to 00
However, without the imposition of further assumptions, neither the principal strata
proportions nor the distribution of Y within any stratum is identied. To see this, note that
6the observed values of Z and T generate four observed subgroups, denoted as o(Z;T), which
are all mixtures of two principal strata, see Table 2. Therefore, also the probability to belong
to an observed subgroup is a mixture of principal strata proportions, henceforth denoted as
tt0  Pr(T(1) = t;T(0) = t0). Let Ptjz represent the observed treatment probability conditional
on assignment, Pr(T = tjZ = z), in the population of interest. Under Assumption 2, which
ensures that the strata proportions conditional on the instrument are equal to the unconditional
strata proportions, the relation between the observed Ptjz and the latent tt0 is as displayed in
Table 3.
Table 3: Observed probabilities and principal strata proportions
Observed cond. selection prob. princ. strata proportions
P1j1  Pr(T = 1jZ = 1) 11 + 10
P0j1  Pr(T = 0jZ = 1) 01 + 00
P1j0  Pr(T = 1jZ = 0) 11 + 01
P0j0  Pr(T = 0jZ = 0) 10 + 00
Thus, point identication of causal eects can only be obtained by invoking further assump-
tions. E.g., under monotonicity of T in Z and eect homogeneity, the ATE on the entire pop-
ulation is identied. Albeit invoked in much of the IV literature, eect homogeneity is a very
unattractive assumption given the rich empirical evidence on eect heterogeneity in the eld of
treatment evaluation. Under monotonicity and eect heterogeneity, the LATE on the compliers
is identied, but this eect may be \too local" to be of policy interest. Fortunately, assump-
tions as monotonicity and stochastic dominance also bear identifying power for further popula-
tions and may yield informative bounds, as discussed in the next section.
3 Assumptions and interval identication
The strategies for the partial identication of ATEs on various populations which we are going to
present in this section are based on the fact that each of the four observed conditional outcomes
7comes from a mixture of two principal strata:
E(Y jZ = 0;T = 1) =
11
11 + 01




 E(Y jZ = 0;T = 1;G = 01);
E(Y jZ = 1;T = 1) =
11
11 + 10




 E(Y jZ = 1;T = 1;G = 10);
E(Y jZ = 0;T = 0) =
10
00 + 10




 E(Y jZ = 0;T = 0;G = 00);
and
E(Y jZ = 1;T = 0) =
01
00 + 01




 E(Y jZ = 1;T = 0;G = 00):
Horowitz and Manski (1995) have shown that whenever it is possible to bound the mixing prob-
ability, sharp bounds can be obtained on any parameter that respects stochastic dominance of
the mixture components. We will use this fact to derive bounds for the ATEs on dierent popu-
lations. Note that similar arguments can be used to obtain bounds on other parameters respect-
ing stochastic dominance, as for instance the quantile treatment eect (QTE), see for instance
Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002) and Fr olich and Melly (2008).
3.1 Worst case bounds
Assume that the support Y of the outcome variable Y is bounded, i.e., Y = [yLB;yUB]. This
condition will rule out innite upper or lower bounds on the ATE of any population. Without
8imposing any restrictions other than Assumptions 1 and 2, we obtain the following equations by
Table 3:
P1j0   01 = 11 ) 01  P1j0; (5)
P0j1   01 = 00 ) 01  P0j1;
P1j1   P1j0 + 01 = 10 ) 01  P1j0   P1j1;
and thus, the lower and upper bounds on the deers' proportion are
01 2 [max(0;P1j0   P1j1);min(P1j0;P0j1)]: (6)
We denote by min
01 = max(0;P1j0 P1j1) and max
01 = min(P1j0;P0j1) the minimum and maximum
of admissible values for 01. The remaining strata proportions can be bounded analogously.
In order to bound the ATEs on the four populations, we introduce some additional notation.
We dene  Yz;t  E(Y jZ = z;T = t) to be the conditional mean of Y given Z = z and T = t.
Furthermore, denote by FYz;t(y)  Pr(Y  yjZ = z;T = t) the conditional cdf of Y given Z = z
and T = t. Let qG
z;t denote the share of individuals belonging to stratum G in the observed






z;t , the value of qG
z;t when 01 is
equal to max
01 or min
01 , respectively. Then, F 1
Yz;t(qG
z;t)  inffy : FYz;t(y)  qG
z;tg is the conditional
quantile function of Y given Z = z and T = t. Finally, let  Yz;t(minjqG
z;t)  E(Y jZ = z;T = t;y 
F 1
Yz;t(qG
z;t)) and  Yz;t(maxjqG
z;t)  E(Y jZ = z;T = t;y  F 1
Yz;t(1   qG
z;t)).
Using this notation, the upper and lower bounds, denoted by UB
10 and LB
10 , for the ATE on










P1j1   P1j0 + 01
(7)
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P1j1   P1j0 + 01
 











P1j1 (the share of always takers among those with Z = 1 and T = 1), q11
0;1 =
P1j0 01




share of never takers among those with Z = 0 and T = 1), and q00
0;0 =
P0j1 01
P0j0 (the share of never
takers among those with Z = 0 and T = 0). The proofs for the sharpness of these bounds as well
as for any bounds proposed below are provided in the appendix.
Four points are worth noting concerning the derivation of the bounds. First of all, they follow
from the application of the results of Horowitz and Manski (1995): since we are able to bound
the strata proportions, we can also bound the mean potential outcomes of the compliers under
treatment and non-treatment by using trimmed means that come from the observed subgroups.
Secondly, (7) has to be optimized w.r.t. admissible deer proportions, dened by (6). Thirdly, the
exclusion restriction (see Assumption 1) gives rise to the maximum and minimum operators. Note
that in the rst (third) line in (7) one computes the upper (lower) bound of the compliers' mean
potential outcome under treatment by subtracting the lower (upper) bound of the mean potential
outcome of the always takers. As their lower (upper) bound under treatment is not aected by the
value of Z due to the exclusion restriction, the lower (upper) bound is the maximum (minimum)
of the always takers' lower (upper) bounds for Z = 1 and Z = 0. An analogous result holds for
lines 2 and 4 w.r.t. the bounds on the potential mean outcomes under non-treatment of the never
takers. Finally, these bounds are dened only if P1j0 < P1j1. This is equivalent to 10 > 01,
saying that the share of compliers is larger than the share of deers.









































These bounds are only dened if P1j0 > P1j1, i.e., if there are more deers than compliers. This
condition together with the previous discussion on the compliers implies that without imposing
monotonicity of the treatment w.r.t. the instrument as outlined below, bounds are informative
either for the deers or for the compliers, but never for both populations.2 This also means
that unless P1j1   P1j0 = 0, either positive (if P1j1   P1j0 > 0) or negative (if P1j0   P1j1 > 0)
monotonicity of T in Z is consistent with the data, but not both at the same time. See also the
discussion in the next subsection.
Concerning the always takers, note that their outcome is only observed under treat-
ment in both o(1;1) and o(0;1). The shares of always takers in o(1;1) and o(0;1) are,
respectively, 11=(11 + 10) = (P1j0   01)=P1j1 and 11=(11 + 01) = (P1j0   01)=P1j0.
Therefore, we can bound the upper and lower values of the mean potential outcome





















, respectively. As already discussed, the intuition for
the optimization over dierent values of the instrument is that Z does not have a direct eect
on the mean potential outcomes. Therefore, the set of admissible potential outcomes for T = 1
is the intersection of possible values under Z = 0 and Z = 1.
Since the outcomes of the always takers are never observed under non-treatment, we have
2An equivalent result for the sample selection framework is discussed in Huber and Mellace (2010).
11to rely on the theoretical upper and lower bounds (at the theoretical ends of the support of Y )
denoted by yUB and yLB, respectively. The sharp upper and lower bounds for the ATE on the

























The bounds are only dened if P1j0 > P0j1 ) 11 > 00, i.e., if the share of always takers is larger
than the share of never takers.
Analogously, the outcomes of never takers are only observed under non-treatment in
both o(0;0) and o(1;0). The shares of never takers in o(0;0) and o(1;0) are, respectively,
00=(00 + 10) = (P0j1   01)=P0j0 and 00=(00 + 01) = (P0j1   01)=P0j1. There-






















respectively. For the never takers, only the outcomes under non-treatment are observed, which
again requires invoking the theoretical lower and upper bounds. The sharp upper and lower
bounds on the ATE of the never takers, 00, are, respectively:
UB























The bounds are dened if P1j0 < P0j1, i.e., if there are more never takers than always takers in
the population.
In the program evaluation literature, the population that received the treatment is often most
interesting. To derive the ATE on the treated population (denoted as T=1), note that it is a
weighted average made up by three populations: the always takers, the compliers, and the deers.
12The shares of these populations are, respectively, given by
2  11
211 + 10 + 01
=




211 + 10 + 01
=









Assuming the upper bound of the mean potential outcome under treatment and Z = 1 for the
always takers,  Y1;1(maxjq11
1;1), implies assuming the lower bound of the mean potential outcome
under treatment for the compliers,  Y1;1(minjq10
1;1), and vice versa, as the weighted average of
both must always yield  Y1;1. For the same reason, assuming the upper bound of the mean
potential outcome under treatment and Z = 0 for the always takers,  Y0;1(maxjq11
0;1), is equivalent
to assuming the lower bound of the mean potential outcome under treatment for the deers,
 Y0;1(minjq01
0;1).
Note that concerning the always takers,  Y0;1(maxjq11
0;1) is part of the upper bound for the
treated if  Y1;1(maxjq11
1;1)   Y0;1(maxjq11
0;1), because the upper bound for the always takers is
min( Y1;1(maxjq11
1;1);  Y0;1(maxjq11
0;1)), see the previous discussion on the exclusion restriction. Thus,
for the values of 01, for which  Y1;1(maxjq11
1;1)   Y0;1(maxjq11





























13while for values of 01 for which  Y1;1(maxjq11
1;1) <  Y0;1(maxjq11





































An analogous result holds for the lower bound. For values of 01 with  Y1;1(minjq11
1;1) 
 Y0;1(minjq11


































































Interestingly, the bounds on T=1 are always informative despite the fact that either the
bounds for the compliers or for the deers are not informative. The bounds on T=1 can be
regarded as a weighted average of the bounds on the always takers, compliers, and deers, however,
taking account for the requirement that assuming the upper bound of one population may imply
14the lower bound for another one. One needs to consider all feasible combinations of upper and
lower bounds to obtain the results (12), (13), (14), and (15). This is discussed in more detail in
the appendix. In a symmetric way one can bound the ATE on the non-treated, T=0, which is
not reported here.
Finally, we derive the bounds for the ATE on the entire population, denoted as . This eect
is a weighted average based on a mixture of all four populations (always takers, compliers, deers,
and never takers). From Table 3, it follows that
11 = P1j0   01; (16)
10 = P1j1   P1j0 + 01;
00 = P0j1   01:
Furthermore, assuming the lower bound of the mean potential outcome given Z = 0 for the
never takers implies assuming the upper bound of the mean potential outcome for the compliers,
and vice versa. The same argument holds for the outcomes of the never takers and deers given
Z = 1. Analogously to T=1, the bounds on  are a function of the intersection of admissible
potential outcomes for T = 1 under Z = 0 and Z = 1 for the always takers and of the intersection
for T = 0 under Z = 0 and Z = 1 for the never takers. Therefore, four possible combinations
for  Y1;1(maxjq11
1;1);  Y0;1(maxjq11
0;1) and  Y1;0(minjq00
1;0);  Y0;0(minjq00
0;0), respectively, arise. However,
as we will show in the appendix, all four combinations yield the same upper and lower bounds,
which are
UB = P1j0   Y0;1   (P1j0   min
01 )  yLB + P1j1   Y1;1 (17)
  (P1j0   min










+ (P0j1   min










  P0j1   Y1;0 + (P0j1   min
01 )  yUB   P0j0   Y0;0 ;
15and
LB = P1j0   Y0;1   (P1j0   01)  yUB + P1j1   Y1;1 (18)




















  P0j1   Y1;0 + (P0j1   01)  yLB   P0j0   Y0;0 :
Again, these bounds are always informative no matter whether the bounds for the compliers or
those for the deers are not informative.
Note that LB; UB might be narrower than the IV bounds derived by Manski (1990). The
reason is that we assume joint independence of the instrument and any potential post-treatment
variable (see Assumption 2) due to randomization of the treatment assignment, whereas Manski
only imposes mean independence of the potential outcomes: E(Y (t)jZ = 1) = E(Y (t)jZ = 0)
for t 2 f0;1g. For the same reason, also Balke and Pearl (1997) nd their bounds to be sharper
than the Manski bounds. However, their result refer to binary outcomes, whereas the ndings
presented here also apply to continuous outcomes.
In order to see the dierence between our bounds and those of Manski, consider the case
that the lower bound on the deer share which is consistent with the data is zero, min
01 = 0.
The appendix shows that UB; LB are maximized and minimized, respectively, for 01 = min
01 ,
just as stated in (17) and (18). Therefore, if min
01 = 0, the worst case bounds coincide with
those under positive monotonicity of T in Z, which imposes 01 = 0 and is discussed in Section
3.2. Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) show that under (an assumption which is equivalent to)
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tjz denote the maximum and minimum values of Ptjz w.r.t. Z. min
01 = 0




P1j1   Y1;1 + P0j1  yUB
 
 
P0j0   Y0;0 + P1j0  yLB
:
On the other hand, since  Y0;1(minjq
11;0
0;1 ) =  Y0;1 and  Y1;0(minjq
00;0




P1j1   Y1;1 + P1j0   Y0;1   P1j0  max( Y1;1(minjq
11;0




P0j0   Y0;0 + P0j1   Y1;0   P0j1  min( Y0;0(maxjq
00;0
0;0 );  Y1;0) + P1j1  yLB

:
After some simple algebra it is easy to see that UB < UB
Ma if either  Y1;1(minjq
11;0
1;1 ) >  Y0;1 or
 Y0;0(maxjq
00;0
0;0 ) <  Y1;0. This suggests that Manski's and our upper bounds are the same unless
the dierence in the potential outcomes of compliers and deers is suciently \large" such that
at least one of the two conditions above is met. Equivalent arguments and results follow for the
lower bound and for the case in which min
01 = P1j0   P1j1.
We conclude the discussion on the worst case bounds by noting that they are likely to be
very wide for the entire population and for most other groups. Therefore, they are often not
helpful for obtaining meaningful results in empirical applications. The following subsections will
introduce further assumptions that appear plausible in many empirical problems and might entail
considerably tighter bounds.
3.2 Monotonicity
This subsection discusses the identifying power of monotonicity of the treatment in the instru-
ment. (Weak) monotonicity of T in Z implies that the treatment state under Z = 1 is at least as
high as under Z = 0 for all individuals.
Assumption 3:
17Pr(T(1)  T(0)) = 1 (montonicity):
As the potential treatment state never decreases in the instrument, the existence of the deers
(stratum 01) is ruled out. A symmetric result is obtained by assuming Pr(T(0)  T(1)) = 1
which implies that stratum 10 does not exist. Note that assuming Pr(T(1)  T(0)) = 1 (positive
monotonicity) is only consistent with the data if P1j1 P1j0  0, otherwise stratum 01 must neces-
sarily exist. Similarly, Pr(T(0)  T(1)) = 1 (negative monotonicity) requires that P1j0 P1j1  0,
see Table 3. Even though these are necessary conditions for the respective monotonicity assump-
tion, they are not sucient. Due to the symmetry of positive and negative monotonicity, we will
only focus on Assumption 3 (positive monotonicity) in the subsequent discussion.
In their seminal paper on the identication of the local average treatment eect (LATE),
Imbens and Angrist (1994) (see also Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996) show that 10 is point
identied under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. I.e., the worst case bounds collapse to a single point




















(P1j1   Y1;1 + P0j1   Y1;0)   (P1j0   Y0;1 + P0j0   Y0;0)
P1j1   P1j0
=
Pr(T = 1jZ = 1)  E(Y jZ = 1;T = 1) + Pr(T = 0jZ = 1)  E(Y jZ = 1;T = 0)
Pr(T = 1jZ = 1)   Pr(T = 1jZ = 0)
 
Pr(T = 1jZ = 0)  E(Y jZ = 0;T = 1) + Pr(T = 0jZ = 0)  E(Y jZ = 0;T = 0)
Pr(T = 1jZ = 1)   Pr(T = 1jZ = 0)
=
E(Y jZ = 1)   E(Y jZ = 0)
E(TjZ = 1)   E(TjZ = 0)
: (19)
The nal equation yields the well known result that the ATE on the compliers is just the ratio
of two dierences in conditional expectations, namely the intention to treat eect divided by the
share of compliers.
There is a further dierence to the worst case scenario worth noting because it allows
constructing tests for the instrumental exclusion restriction. Under monotonicity the observed
18subgroup o(0;1) (not instrumented but treated) consists of always takers only, such that
 Y0;1 immediately gives the mean potential outcome under treatment for the always takers.








(with 01 = 0) is, thus, not required here. Note, however,
that this comparison gives a testable implication for the exclusion restriction. If it holds,
 Y1;1(minjq11
1;1)   Y0;1   Y1;1(maxjq11
1;1), otherwise Z has a direct eect on the outcomes
of the always takers. Similarly,  Y1;0 is the mean potential outcome under non-treatment
for the never takers. Therefore, another testable implication of the exclusion restriction is
 Y0;0(minjq00
0;0)   Y1;0   Y0;0(maxjq00
0;0).3
In the absence of deers the bounds for the always takers and never takers (11 and 00)
simplify to
UB
11 =  Y0;1   yLB; (20)
LB
11 =  Y0;1   yUB;
and
UB
00 = yUB    Y1;0; (21)
LB
00 = yLB    Y1;0:
These bound are sharp because E(Y jT = 1;G = 11) and E(Y jT = 0;G = 00) are now point
identied by  Y0;1 and  Y1;0 (if the exclusion restriction holds). However, monotonicity does not
impose any restrictions on the distributions of Y jT = 0;G = 11 and Y jT = 1;G = 00 such that
the worst case bounds yLB;yUB have to be assumed.
Under the monotonicity assumption, the bounds on the ATEs of the treated (T=1) and the
3Kitagawa and Hoderlein (2009) propose a formal test for the validity of instruments. They test for both
violations of the exclusion restriction and the monotonicity assumption jointly by checking for negative densities
of the compliers' treated or non-treated outcomes, whereas the testable implications considered here only refer to
the exclusion restriction.
19entire population () are trivially derived as a linear combination of the ATE on the compliers
and the bounds for the always takers and never takers, respectively. These components are
weighted by the share of the respective population, which is point identied in the absence of




















UB = P1j0  UB
11 + (P1j1   P1j0)  10 + P0j1  UB
00 ; (23)
LB = P1j0  LB
11 + (P1j1   P1j0)  10 + P0j1  LB
00 :
These bounds are sharp because the bounds on the always takers and never takers are sharp.
Interestingly, Balke and Pearl (1997), Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), and Kitagawa (2009)
show that under monotonicity, their bounds of the ATE on the entire population coincide with the
worst case bounds of Manski (1990) who only imposes the exclusion restriction. I.e., Assumption
3 does, if it is satised, not bring any additional identifying power for . As already mentioned
in Section 3.1, this is also the case for our bounds. It is easy to show that for min
01 = 0 (positive
monotonicity), the worst case bounds 17 and 18 collapse to those in 23. This is due to the fact that
under monotonicity, the exclusion restriction implies that  Yz;t(minjqG
z;t)   Yz;t   Yz;t(maxjqG
z;t).
3.3 Stochastic dominance
Stochastic dominance states that the potential outcome evaluated at any rank in the distribution
of one population is at least as high as that of some other population. This rules out the crossing
of potential outcomes of two populations. The stochastic dominance assumption has been used
in the sample selection framework by Zhang and Rubin (2003), Lechner and Melly (2007), Zhang,
20Rubin, and Mealli (2008), Lee (2009), and Huber and Mellace (2010). We will show that it also
bears identifying power in the IV framework.
Assumption 4:
Pr(Y (t)jG = 10  y)  Pr(Y (t)jG = g  y) 8 t 2 f0;1g; g 2 f11;00g;y in the support of Y
(stochastic dominance):
Assumption 4 states that at any rank, the potential outcomes of the compliers are at least as the
high as those of the always takers and the never takers. When considering the ATE, stochastic
dominance is only required to hold w.r.t. the mean. The latter condition is weaker than the way
Assumption 4 is stated, which, for instance, also restricts the variance across dierent populations.
However, Assumption 4 would be required when considering quantile treatment eects, too.
Furthermore, note that the kind of stochastic dominance considered here is only one out of many
possible relations between the potential outcomes of various populations. Its plausibility has to
be judged in the light of the empirical application and theoretical considerations. Fortunately and
as discussed in the next subsection, stochastic dominance has testable implications if it is jointly
assumed with monotonicity. In the application presented in Section 5 we will test Assumption 4
and show that it is not rejected at any reasonable signicance level.










P1j1   P1j0 + 01
(24)
 
P0j0   Y0;0   (P0j1   01)  min
  Y0;0;  Y1;0(maxjq00
1;0)








P1j1   Y1;1   (P1j0   01)  min
  Y1;1;  Y0;1(maxjq11
0;1)

P1j1   P1j0 + 01
 





P1j1   P1j0 + 01
#
:
The intuition of this result is that the compliers' mean potential outcome under treatment
cannot be lower than that of the always takers, while under non-treatment it cannot be
21lower than the one of the never takers. Therefore, we now have the minimization problems
min




  Y1;1;  Y0;1(maxjq11
0;1)

, as  Y0;0 is the lower bound on the
compliers' mean potential outcome in the mixed population with the deers and  Y1;1 in the
mixed group with the always takers. The sharpness of these bounds and all other bounds under
stochastic dominance proposed below follows from the fact that they are special cases of the
worst case bounds and that we can apply Lemma 1 in Huber and Mellace (2010) to formally
prove their sharpness.
The bounds for the deers are the same as in the worst case scenario, since we do not impose
any stochastic dominance assumption w.r.t. the potential outcomes of this population. The




















































1;0 );  Y0;0

:
 Y1;1,  Y0;0 are now the upper bounds on the mean potential outcome under treatment and the mean
potential outcome under non-treatment for the always takers and the never takers, respectively.
Moreover, stochastic dominance implies that the always takers' upper bound under non-treatment
cannot be higher than the compliers' upper bound under non-treatment and that the never
takers' upper bound under treatment cannot be higher than the compliers' upper bound under
treatment. This is a considerable improvement over the worst case bounds, as it allows us to
22replace the theoretical upper bound yUB by observed quantities. Note that the substitution of
the theoretical upper bounds by the compliers' bounds requires the optimization over all possible
values of 01.
The upper bound on the ATE of the treated is now a function of  Y1;1 and  Y0;1(maxjq11
0;1). For
those values of 01 for which  Y1;1   Y0;1(maxjq11





















P0j1   Y1;0   (P0j1   01)  min
















P0j0   Y0;0   (P0j1   01)  min
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2  (P1j0   01)  P0j0
(P1j1 + P1j0)  (P1j1   P1j0 + 01)
  Y0;0 (29)
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P1j0   Y0;1   (P1j0   01)  yLB + P1j1   Y1;1 (31)







P0j1   01)  min
  Y0;0;  Y1;0(maxjq00
1;0)

  P0j1   Y1;0
+ (P0j1   01) 





P1j1   P1j0 + 01







P1j0   Y0;1 + P1j1   Y1;1 (32)
  (P1j0   01) 





P1j1   P1j0 + 01
  (P1j0   01)  min
  Y1;1;  Y0;1(maxjq11
0;1)






  P0j1   Y1;0 + (P0j1   01)  yLB   P0j0   Y0;0

:
In contrast to the worst case bounds, we have to optimize w.r.t. 01 under stochastic dominance
because some of the theoretical bounds have been substituted by the compliers' bounds.
While invoking either monotonicity or stochastic dominance might tighten the bounds con-
siderably (or even lead to point identication for the compliers), a joint imposition of both as-
24sumptions is likely shrink the identied sets even further. Therefore, the next section discusses
the joint identifying power of monotonicity and stochastic dominance.
3.4 Monotonicity and stochastic dominance
In this subsection we derive the bounds under both monotonicity (Assumption 3) and stochastic
dominance (Assumption 4). Since 10 is point identied under Assumptions 1 to 3, Assumption
4 does not bring any further improvement w.r.t. the compliers. For all other populations, the
bounds become tighter by invoking both assumptions.
The upper and lower bounds of the ATE on the always takers are now
UB
11 =  Y0;1   yLB; (33)
LB










As under stochastic dominance, the upper bound of the always takers' mean potential outcome
under non-treatment cannot be higher than the compliers' upper bound under non-treatment.
Furthermore, monotonicity implies that the latter is point identied by
P0j0
P1j1 P1j0   Y0;0 
P0j1
P1j1 P1j0 
 Y1;0. Again, LB
11 is sharp by Lemma 1 in Huber and Mellace (2010). Similarly, the bounds for











   Y1;0; (34)
LB
00 = yLB    Y1;0:
By the monotonicity assumption,
P1j1
P1j1 P1j0   Y1;1  
P1j0
P1j1 P1j0   Y0;1 is the compliers' mean potential
outcome under treatment. Under stochastic dominance, this is an upper bound for the never
takers' mean potential outcome under treatment.
As under monotonicity, the bounds for the treated and the entire population are weighted




















UB = P1j0  UB
11 + (P1j1   P1j0)  10 + P0j1  UB
00 ; (36)
LB = P1j0  LB
11 + (P1j1   P1j0)  10 + P0j1  LB
00 :
As a nal remark it is worth noting that under Assumptions 1 to 3, Assumption 4 (stochastic
dominance) is testable. Recall that the always takers' potential outcome distribution is identied
by Y jZ = 0;T = 1. Therefore, stochastic dominance of the compliers can be tested by comparing
the distributions of Y jZ = 0;T = 1 and Y jZ = 1;T = 1, which also encounters compliers and,
therefore, has to stochastically dominate. Equivalently, the distribution of Y jZ = 1;T = 0,
which are the never takers' potential outcomes under non-treatment, must be dominated by the
distribution of Y jZ = 0;T = 0, which contains never takers and compliers. The intuition is that
since the distribution of the potential outcomes of always takers (never takers) is not aected
by Z under the exclusion restriction, the observed subgroup consisting of both compliers and
always takers (never takers) stochastically dominates the observed subgroup with always takers
(never takers) alone. The respective null hypotheses to be tested are Pr(Y jZ = 1;T = 1  y) 
Pr(Y jZ = 0;T = 1  y) and Pr(Y jZ = 0;T = 0  y)  Pr(Y jZ = 1;T = 0  y) for all y in the
support of Y , see Section 5 for the application of stochastic dominance tests.
4 Estimation
Estimators can be constructed by using the sample analogs of the bounds derived under the var-
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^ yLB  min(Y ); ^ yUB  max(Y )
where Ifg is the indicator function. Using these expressions instead of the population parameters
in the various formulas for the bounds immediately yields feasible estimators.
p
n-consistency
and asymptotic normality of the estimators under monotonicity or monotonicity and stochastic
dominance follows from the results by Lee (2009) and its discussion is, therefore, omitted.
5 Application
We apply the methods outlined in the last sections to a randomized experiment that was con-
ducted within the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), a large publicly-funded U.S. training
program taking place in the 1980s and 1990s. The largest JTPA component was training for eco-
nomically disadvantaged individuals, the so called \Title II". The latter covered roughly 1 million
participants per year in the early 1990s, see for instance Orr, Bloom, Bell, Doolittle, Lin, and
Cave (1996) for more details. The sample we investigate has been previously analyzed by Abadie,
Angrist, and Imbens (2002) and consists of 11,204 adults that had applied for Title II between
27November 1987 and September 1989. Applicants were randomly assigned to be oered a training
and those not receiving an oer were excluded from Title II for 18 months. We evaluate the
average eect of the training on the sum of earnings in the 30-months after training assignment,
which, according to Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002), is a suitable measure of the program's
lasting economic impact on participants.
Table 4: Observed strata proportions
Conditional treatment probability estimate standard error
P1j1  Pr(T = 1jZ = 1) 0.642 (0.006)
P0j1  Pr(T = 0jZ = 1) 0.358 (0.006)
P1j0  Pr(T = 1jZ = 0) 0.015 (0.002)
P0j0  Pr(T = 0jZ = 0) 0.985 (0.002)
Let Z denote the random assignment indicator, Y the earnings outcome, and T the actual
training state. As shown in Table 4, compliance with the treatment assignment was not perfect.
Only 64.2 % of those who were oered a training actually took advantage of the oer, while 35.8
% did not. 98.5 % of the individuals that were randomized out did not receive the training, but
1.5 % participated anyway. Table 5 reports the estimated bounds on the strata proportions in
the worst case scenario and the respective point estimates under Assumption 3 (monotonicity).
Table 5: Estimated (bounds on the) proportions of latent strata
Latent strata Worst case bounds Proportions under monotonicity
Always takers [0.000, 0.015] 0.015
Compliers [0.627, 0.642] 0.627
Never takers [0.343, 0.358] 0.358
Deers [0.000, 0.015] -
We estimate bounds on the ATEs of the compliers, the always takers, the never takers, the
treated, and the total population under the worst case, stochastic dominance, and/or monotonic-
ity. Whenever optimization over the share of deers is required, we use an equidistant grid of
100 values within the minimum (0) and maximum(0:015) possible share. We do not estimate
deer eects because ^ P1j1 > ^ P0j1, implying that the bounds for the deers are not informative in
the worst case scenario. Furthermore, deers are ruled out under monotonicity (and under both
28monotonicity and stochastic dominance). Finally, note that also the bounds for the always takers
are not informative in the worst case scenario, because ^ P1j0 < ^ P0j1 such that the share of always
takers is smaller than the share of never takers. However, under monotonicity and/or stochastic
dominance, informative bounds can be obtained for this population.
Concerning inference, we compute the 95% condence intervals for the respective ATE (i.e.,
for the parameters of interest, not for its bounds) based on the method described in Imbens and
Manski (2004):

^ LB   1:645  ^ LB; ^ UB + 1:645  ^ UB

;
where ^ LB; ^ UB are the estimated bounds and ^ LB; ^ UB denote their respective estimated stan-
dard errors. The latter are obtained by bootstrapping the original sample 1999 times and esti-
mating ^ LB; ^ UB in each bootstrap replication in order to estimate their distributions. As worst
case bounds yUB and yLB, we take the maximum and minimum cumulative earnings observed in
the data, which are 155,760 and 0, respectively.
Table 6: ATE estimates and condence intervals
Assumptions Compliers Always takers Never takers Treated Entire pop.
Worst case [628, 1942] [-155760, 65536] [-13980, 143943] [-4569, 2408] [-5924, 52163]
(-114, 2686) Not informative (-14453, 162095) (-6152, 3122) (-6599, 58939)
Stoch. dom. [637, 1942] [-16803, 17440] [-13980, 5624] [-521, 2408] [-4405, 2673]
(-102, 2686) (-17452, 17851) (-14452, 6221) (-1284, 3121) (-4858, 3192)
Monoton. [1849, 1849] [-142245, 13515] [-13980, 141780] [-4532, 2365] [-5917, 52163]
(945, 2753) (-160550, 16390) (-14453, 159859) (-6114, 3081) (-6590, 58939)
Both [1849, 1849] [-2167, 13515] [-13980, 3551] [1671, 2365] [-3882, 2628]
(945, 2753) (-4990, 16390) (-14453, 4131) (933, 3081) (-4333, 3151)
Bounds in square brackets and 95 % condence intervals in round brackets.
Condence intervals are based on 1999 bootstraps. Average treatment eects are rounded.
Table 6 presents the results under the various assumptions. The bounds of the ATE estimates
are given in square brackets, the 95% condence intervals are in round brackets. The worst case
bounds are not informative for the always takers and very wide for all other populations apart
from the compliers. For the latter, we nd a positive ATE, even without imposing any further
assumptions on top of the exclusion restriction. However, the eect is not statistically signicant
29on the 5% level. Imposing stochastic dominance narrows the bounds for the compliers only
slightly and the eect is again not signicant. Even though the assumption has more identifying
power for the other populations, the identication region of any group other than the compliers
still includes a zero eect.
As discussed before, monotonicity of T in Z (such that deers are ruled out) entails point
identication of the ATE on the compliers. The estimate, which is highly signicant, suggests that
on average, training generates 1849 USD of additional earnings in the 30-months after training
assignment for those participating in the training if assigned and not participating if not. The
bounds for any other group, however, still include the possibility of a zero eect on earnings.
When invoking both monotonicity and stochastic dominance, the results suggest that the ATE
on the treated, which often represent the most interesting (from a policy perspective) population,
is signicantly positive. Both its upper and lower bound are not too far from the point estimate
for the compliers, suggesting that the eects on both populations might be comparable in the
application considered.
As mentioned in Section 3.4, stochastic dominance of the compliers' potential outcomes has
testable implications if monotonicity holds. We test the null hypotheses of stochastic dominance
w.r.t. the always takers and the never takers, namely that Pr(Y jZ = 1;T = 1  y)  Pr(Y jZ =
0;T = 1  y) and Pr(Y jZ = 0;T = 0  y)  Pr(Y jZ = 1;T = 0  y) for all y in the support
of Y , by means of one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for two samples. The test statistics are
reported in Table 7 and are not signicant, suggesting that stochastic dominance cannot be
rejected in either case.
Table 7: Stochastic dominance tests
H0: Compliers dominate always takers H0: Compliers dominate never takers
KS test statistic 0.026 0.006
p-value 0.931 0.896
Finally, Table 8 gives the estimates separately for the 6,102 females and 5,102 males in the
sample. In general, the bounds for the females tend to be tighter the the ones for the males.
30Furthermore, the former provide more evidence in favor of a positive eect of the training on the
cumulative earnings. The ATE on the compliers is signicantly positive even in the worst case
scenario. Under monotonicity and stochastic dominance, also the lower bound for the always
takers is positive (in addition to the complier eect and the lower bound of the ATE on the
treated, which are positive in all samples), albeit not statistically signicant.
Table 8: ATE estimates and condence intervals by gender
Females
Assumptions Compliers Always takers Never takers Treated Entire pop.
Worst case [928, 2075] [-114739, 65536] [-11934, 104756] [-3426, 2598] [-4612, 36704]
(53, 2949) Not informative (-12582, 120490) (-5070, 3496) (-5350, 42402)
Stoch. dom [957, 2075] [-13267, 14224] [-11934, 4244] [21, 2567] [-3234, 2348]
(77, 2869) (-14053, 14640) (-12465, 5078) (-916, 3362) (-3832, 2977)
Monoton. [1942, 1942] [-101576, 13163] [-11934, 102805] [-3391, 2520] [-4612, 36704]
(906, 2977) (-117690, 17106) (-12582, 118567) (-5045, 3398) (-5350, 42402)
Both [1942, 1942] [852, 13163] [-11934, 2320] [1886, 2520] [-2832, 2266]
(906, 2977) (-3299, 17106) (-12582, 3129) (981, 3398) (-3412, 2901)
Males
Assumptions Compliers Always takers Never takers Treated Entire pop.
Worst case [606, 1881] [-155760, 50316] [-16216, 141489] [-3306, 2292] [-6579, 53906]
(-978, 3440) Not informative (-17079, 157783) (-5699, 3802) (-7686, 60166)
Stoch. dom. [612, 1881] [-20909, 21521] [-16216, 7254] [-563, 2292] [-5580, 3353]
(-969, 3440) (-22510, 22379) (-17079, 8428) (-2218, 3803) (-6512, 4425)
Monoton. [1825, 1825] [-141596, 14164] [-16216, 139544] [-3222, 2260] [-6579, 53906]
(-45, 3696) (-157341, 18261) (-17079, 155721) (-5609, 3769) (-7686, 60166)
Both [1825, 1825] [-5666, 14164] [-16216, 5439] [1562, 2260] [-5063, 3326]
(-45, 3696) (-9937, 18261) (-17079, 6601) (8, 3769) (-5987, 4401)
Note: Bounds in square brackets and 95 % condence intervals in round brackets.
Condence intervals are based on 1999 bootstraps. Average treatment eects are rounded.
316 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the question of what can be learnt about the average treatment eects
(ATE) on various populations under endogeneity/noncompliance when a valid instrumental vari-
able (IV) is at hand. Since the work by Imbens and Angrist (1994) it is well known that a local
ATE (LATE) on the compliers (who take the treatment if instrumented, but do not if not) is
point identied under monotonicity of the treatment in the instrument. Even though point iden-
tication is not feasible for other groups, we show that informative bounds can be obtained for
the always takers (treated irrespective of the instrument), the never takers (not treated irrespec-
tive of the instrument), the treated population, and the entire population. We also investigate
the identifying power of stochastic dominance of the potential outcomes of the compliers over
those of the always takers and never never takers.
The main contribution is the derivation of sharp bounds under monotonicity, under stochastic
dominance, and under both assumptions. Using estimators that are based on the sample analogs
of our identication results, we also provide an application to the U.S. Job Training Partnership
Act using experimental data previously analyzed by Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002). We
nd (on top of the complier eect) a signicantly positive ATE on the earnings of the treated,
a group of major policy interest. As valuable \by-products" of our identication results we also
obtain testable implications of the IV exclusion restriction (no direct eect of the instrument
on the outcome) and of stochastic dominance, respectively, when monotonicity is assumed. The
statistical power of these implications might be investigated in future research.
32A Appendix
A.1 Worst case scenario
We will only show the sharpness of the upper bounds, the proofs for the lower bounds are symmetric.
A.1.1 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the compliers
First of all, note that if w is a random variable which is distributed as a two components mixture
f(w) = p  f(w1) + (1   p)  f(w2) p 2 [0;1];
then
E(w) = p  E(w1)
UB + (1   p)  E(w2)
LB; (A.1)
where E(w1)
UB is the upper bound of E(w1) and E(w2)
LB is the lower bound of E(w2). By Assumption 1 and
equations (2) and (3) we have
E(Y jT = 1;G = 10)
UB =
P1j1
P1j1   P1j0 + 01
  Y1;1 (A.2)
 
P1j0   01
P1j1   P1j0 + 01
 E(Y jT = 1;G = 11)
LB;
and
E(Y jT = 0;G = 10)
LB =
P0j0
P1j1   P1j0 + 01
  Y0;0 (A.3)
 
P0j1   01
P1j1   P0j1 + 01
 E(Y jT = 0;G = 00)
UB:
Lemma 1 together with Proposition 1 in Imai (2008) implies that  Y1;1(minjq
11
1;1) is the sharp lower bound of
E(Y jZ = 1;T = 1;G = 11) and that  Y0;1(minjq
11
0;1) is the sharp lower bound of E(Y jZ = 0;T = 1;G = 11).
By Assumption 1, E(Y jZ = 1;T = 1;G = 11) = E(Y jZ = 0;T = 1;G = 11) = E(Y jT = 1;G = 11). Thus,
E(Y jT = 1;G = 11)   Y1;1(minjq
11
1;1) and E(Y jT = 1;G = 11)   Y0;1(minjq
11
0;1). This implies that









Similarly, Lemma 1 together with Proposition 1 in Imai (2008) implies that  Y0;0(maxjq
00
0;0) is the sharp upper
bound of E(Y jZ = 0;T = 0;G = 00) and that  Y1;0(maxjq
00
1;0) is the sharp upper bound of E(Y jZ = 1;T =
330;G = 00). Again, by Assumption 1 we have E(Y jT = 0;G = 00)   Y1;0(maxjq
00













This shows that 
UB
10 = E(Y jT = 1;G = 10)
UB   E(Y jT = 0;G = 10)
LB is the sharp upper bound of 10 for a
given value of 01, which is unknown. Therefore, 
UB
10 is obtained by maximizing w.r.t. 01.
A.1.2 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the deers
By Assumption 1, (A.1), (1) and (4) we have








 E(Y jT = 1;G = 11)
LB;
and








 E(Y jT = 0;G = 00)
UB:
Thus, by (A.4) and (A.5), 
UB
01 = E(Y jT = 1;G = 01)
UB   E(Y jT = 0;G = 01)
LB is the sharp upper bound of
01 for a given value of 01, which is unknown. Therefore, 
UB
01 is obtained by maximizing w.r.t. 01.
A.1.3 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the always takers
Lemma 1 together with Proposition 1 in Imai (2008) implies that  Y1;1(maxjq
11
1;1) is the sharp upper bound of
E(Y jZ = 1;T = 1;G = 11) and that  Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1) is the sharp upper bound of E(Y jZ = 0;T = 1;G = 11). By
Assumption 1, E(Y jT = 1;G = 11)   Y1;1(maxjq
11
1;1) and E(Y jT = 1;G = 11)   Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1). This implies that









Since the sampling process does not impose any restriction on Y jT = 0;G = 11 for a xed value of 01, 
UB
11 =
E(Y jT = 1;G = 11)
UB   y
LB is the sharp upper bound of 11. Since both  Y1;1(maxjq
11
1;1) and  Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1) are
increasing in 01, 
UB
11 is maximized for 01 = 
max
01 .
34A.1.4 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the never takers
Lemma 1 together with Proposition 1 in Imai (2008) implies that  Y0;0(minjq
00
0;0) is the sharp lower bound of
E(Y jZ = 0;T = 0;G = 00) and that  Y1;0(minjq
00
1;0) is the sharp lower bound of E(Y jZ = 1;T = 0;G = 00). Again,
by Assumption 1 we have that E(Y jT = 0;G = 00)   Y1;0(minjq
00

















UB   E(Y jT = 0;G = 00)
LB is the sharp upper bound of 00. Since both  Y0;0(minjq
00
0;0) and  Y1;0(minjq
00
1;0) are
decreasing in 01, 
UB
00 is maximized for 01 = 
max
01 .
A.1.5 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the treated
We will only show the sharpness of the upper bound given that  Y1;1(maxjq
11
1;1)   Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1). The proof for the
case that  Y1;1(maxjq
11
1;1) <  Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1) is symmetric and the proof for the lower bound could be derived in an
analogous way to the upper bound and is, therefore, omitted. Note that
T=1 =
2  (P1j0   01)
P1j1 + P1j0
 11 +






For the upper bound, substituting 11 by 
UB
11 , 10 by 
UB
10 and 01 by 
UB
01 in (A.10) would give a sharp upper
bound on T=1. However, such a bound would contradict (A.1) since it is impossible to have the upper bounds
for the always takers and the deers at the same time in the mixture. This, however, shows that the admissible





























































































































































which is always satised since  Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1)   Y1;1(minjq
11
1;1) by Assumption 1. Thus, 
UB1
T=1 is the sharp upper
bound of T=1, given that  Y1;1(maxjq
11
1;1)   Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1) and for a given value of 01, which is unknown.
Therefore, we have to maximize 
UB1
T=1 w.r.t. 01 to obtain the upper bound.
A.1.6 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the entire population
We will only prove the sharpness of the upper bound. The proof for the lower bound is analogous and is omitted









0;0) yield the same upper bound. To see this, suppose the contrary. Then, we would
compute the upper bound for the entire population in a similar way as the one for the treated. Thus, for the values
36of 01 for which  Y1;1   Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1) and  Y1;0(minjq
00
1;0)   Y0;0(minjq
00





P1j0   Y0;1   (P1j0   01)  y
LB + (P1j1   P1j0 + 01)  
UB
10 (A.15)
+ (P0j1   01) 







P1j1   P1j0 + 01





P1j0   Y0;1   (P1j0   01)  y
LB + P1j1   Y1;1









P0j1   01)  min




  P0j1   Y1;0
+ (P0j1   01) 







P1j1   P1j0 + 01
  P0j1   Y1;0

:
Secondly, for the values of 01 for which  Y1;1   Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1) and  Y1;0(minjq
00








P1j1   Y1;1   (P1j0   01)  y
LB + 01  
UB
01 (A.16)
+ (P0j1   01) 







P1j1   P1j0 + 01





P1j0   Y0;1   (P1j0   01)  y
LB + P1j1   Y1;1









P0j1   01)  min




  P0j1   Y1;0
+ (P0j1   01) 







P1j1   P1j0 + 01
  P0j1   Y1;0

:
For the values of 01 for which  Y1;1   Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1) and  Y1;0(minjq
00
1;0)   Y0;0(minjq
00





P1j0   Y0;1   (P1j0   01)  y
LB + P1j1   Y1;1 (A.17)









P0j1   01)  min




  P0j1   Y1;0
+ (P0j1   01) 







P1j1   P1j0 + 01
  P0j1   Y1;0

:
Finally, for the values of 01 for which  Y1;1(maxjq
11
1;1)   Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1) and  Y1;0(minjq
00








P1j0   Y0;1   (P1j0   01)  y
LB + P1j1   Y1;1 (A.18)









P0j1   01)  min




  P0j1   Y1;0
+ (P0j1   01) 







P1j1   P1j0 + 01
  P0j1   Y1;0

:







In order to see that 
UB is sharp, note that
 = (P1j0   01)  11 + (P1j1   P1j0 + 01)  10 + 01  01 + (P0j1   01)  00: (A.19)
For the upper bound, substituting 11 by 
UB
11 , 10 by 
UB
10 , 01 by 
UB
01 and 00 by 
UB
00 in (A.19) would
give a sharp upper bound on . However, such a bound would contradict (A.1), since it is impossible to have the
upper bounds for the always takers and the deers and the lower bounds for the never takers and the deers at
the same time in the mixtures. Because of the symmetry of the problem, we will just consider the case in which
 Y1;1(maxjq
11
1;1)   Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1) and  Y1;0(minjq
00
1;0)   Y0;0(minjq
00
0;0). In this case we can directly substitute 10
by 
UB
10 in (A.19), without contradicting (A.1).
Given (A.19) and (A.1), the sharp upper bound under  Y1;1(maxjq
11
1;1)   Y0;1(maxjq
11










(P1j0   01)  ( Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1)   y
LB) + (P1j0   01)  
UB
10 (A.20)
+ P1j0  Y0;1   (P1j0   01)   Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1)
  P0j1  Y1;0 + (P0j1   01)   Y1;0(minjq
00
1;0)
+ (P0j1   01)  (y







(P1j0   01)  
UB
10   (P1j0   01)  y
LB








(P1j0   01)  ( Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1)   y
LB) + (P1j0   01)  
UB
10 (A.21)
+ P1j0  Y0;1   (P1j0   01)   Y0;1(maxjq
11
0;1)
  P0j1  Y1;0 + (P0j1   01)   Y1;0(maxjq
00
1;0)
+ (P0j1   01)  (y







(P1j0   01)  
UB
10   (P1j0   01)  y
LB








(P1j0   01)  ( Y0;1(minjq
11
0;1)   y
LB) + (P1j0   01)  
UB
10 (A.22)
+ P1j0  Y0;1   (P1j0   01)   Y0;1(minjq
11
0;1)
  P0j1  Y1;0 + (P0j1   01)   Y1;0(minjq
00
1;0)
+ (P0j1   01)  (y







(P1j0   01)  
UB
10   (P1j0   01)  y
LB








(P1j0   01)  ( Y0;1(minjq
11
0;1)   y
LB) + (P1j0   01)  
UB
10 (A.23)
+ P1j0  Y0;1   (P1j0   01)   Y0;1(minjq
11
0;1)
  P0j1  Y1;0 + (P0j1   01)   Y1;0(maxjq
00
1;0)
+ (P0j1   01)  (y







(P1j0   01)  
UB
10   (P1j0   01)  y
LB










UB is the sharp upper bound for . Finally we have have to
show that 
UB is maximized for 01 = 
min
01 . It is sucient to see that the rst derivative of 


































which is always satised.
A.2 Monotonicity
A.2.1 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the always takers
Under monotonicity and the IV exclusion restriction E(Y jT = 1;G = 11) is identied by  Y0;1. Since monotonicity
does not impose any restrictions on the distribution of Y jT = 0;G = 11 the worst case bounds y
LB;y
UB have to




11 are the sharp upper and lower bounds of 11.
A.2.2 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the never takers
Under monotonicity and the IV exclusion restriction E(Y jT = 0;G = 00) is identied by  Y1;0. Since monotonicity
does not impose any restrictions on the distribution of Y jT = 1;G = 00 the worst case bounds y
LB;y
UB have to




00 are the sharp upper and lower bounds of 00.
A.2.3 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the treated
These bounds are linear combinations of 10 and the bounds on 11. Therefore, they are sharp.
A.2.4 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the entire population
These bounds are linear combinations of 10 and the bounds on 11 and 00. Therefore, they are sharp.
A.3 Stochastic dominance
Lemma 1 in Huber and Mellace (2010) shows that under stochastic dominance, the upper bounds of E(Y jT =
1;Z = 1;G = 11) and E(Y jT = 0;Z = 0;G = 00) are  Y1;1 and  Y0;0, respectively. Moreover, stochastic dominance
implies that E(Y jT = 0;G = 11)  E(Y jT = 0;G = 10) and E(Y jT = 1;G = 00)  E(Y jT = 1;G = 10). All
bounds are special cases of the worst case bounds under the restrictions just mentioned. Therefore, all of them are
40sharp.
A.4 Monotonicity and stochastic dominance
A.4.1 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for always takers
Under monotonicity and the IV exclusion restriction E(Y jT = 1;G = 11) is identied by  Y0;1. Stochastic dominance
implies that E(Y jT = 0;G = 11)  E(Y jT = 0;G = 10) =
P0j0 Y0;0 P0j1 Y1;0
P1j1 P1j0 . Thus, 
LB
11 is the sharp lower bound
of 11.
A.4.2 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for never takers
Under monotonicity and the IV exclusion restriction E(Y jT = 0;G = 00) is identied by  Y1;0. Stochastic dominance
implies that E(Y jT = 1;G = 00)  E(Y jT = 1;G = 10) =
P1j1 Y1;1 P1j0 Y0;1
P1j1 P1j0 . Thus, 
UB
00 is the sharp upper bound
of 00.
A.4.3 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the treated
These bounds are linear combinations of 10 and the bounds on 11. Therefore, they are sharp.
A.4.4 Proof of the sharpness of the bounds for the entire population
These bounds are linear combinations of 10 and the bounds on 11 and 00. Therefore, they are sharp.
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